This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science.
Introduction
One of the driving forces behind the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump was arguably working-class discontent -the increasingly bleak life chances of blue collar workers (O'Reilly et al. 2017) . The American and British working classes are not alone in facing difficult prospects. The two decades between the fall of the Wall and the Great Recession were not a good period for Germany's working class either. Mass unemployment, welfare state retrenchment and the decline of trade unions weakened low educated workers' position in the labour market. As a result, the 1990s and 2000s brought a rise in low-paid work and wage inequality (Bosch 2009 ). While real wages increased at the top of the earnings distribution, they declined at the bottom (Antonczyk et al. 2010 ).
The widening gap in life chances between the top and the bottom of Germany's class structure -between the upper-middle and the working class -is well documented (Streeck 2009 ). The question raised in this paper is whether this growing economic disparity was also accompanied by an increasing gap in workers' life satisfaction. We answer this question by analysing for Germany the extent and evolution of the social class gradient in life satisfaction since the mid-1980s. Our paper thus examines whether, over the last decades, the gap in subjective well-being between the upper-middle and the working class widened in Germany.
A sizable body of research analyses inequality in life satisfaction over time and across countries, commonly measured using the variance of life satisfaction within the entire population (e. g. Alesina et al. 2004, Delhey and Kohler 2011) . Enquiries into the social class gradient of life satisfaction are harder to come by. A recent study suggests that the gap in psychological wellbeing has not widened between the working and the middle classes since the early 1990s in Britain (Richards and Paskov 2016) .
With respect to Germany, we know that the working class has lost out in terms of earnings between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s (Bosch 2009 ). The open question is as to whether it was also left behind in terms of life satisfaction. However, an increasing gap in life satisfaction between social classes in Germany may well be driven by other causes than the increasing disparity in economic opportunities. Notably, it may be the result of international trends such as globalization (and offshoring) or skill-biased technological change (and automation), which arguably make life more difficult for the lower classes everywhere in Western Europe.
We address this issue by comparing the evolution in life satisfaction in Germany with that in Switzerland, a neighbouring country that was exposed to the same shifts in trade and technology, but where labour market institutions, wage inequality and the proportion of lowpaid work remained stable over the last two decades (Grabka and Kuhn 2012) .
Our paper makes three contributions. First, it presents novel evidence on the surprisingly large extent of the class gap in life satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland -and uses the best available microdata to show how it evolved over the last decades. Second, it shows that during Germany's long economic stagnation of the 1990s and early 2000s, the social class gradient in life satisfaction widened, while it remained basically constant in the comparison case of Switzerland. The main driver behind this growing class gap was the differential exposure of the upper-middle and the low-skilled working class to the risk of unemployment and low earnings. Finally, our paper addresses the scepticism about the feasibility of reliably measuring life satisfaction by replicating our analysis with a second dataset. We present We first discuss the literature on inequality in subjective wellbeing. We then show that Germany's working class was left behind during the country's long economic stagnation of the 1990s and early 2000s, leading to our hypothesis of a widening class gap in life satisfaction in Germany, but not in Switzerland. We then discuss our data, measures and estimation method and present our results for the evolution of the social class gradient in life satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland. The conclusion puts our findings into a larger context.
The link between economic inequality and life satisfaction
Research on subjective wellbeing has become a growth industry in recent years, spurred by the increasing availability of surveys that include questions about life satisfaction and happiness. If one focuses on studies covering at least a decade worth of data, the commonly reported finding is that larger income inequality is linked with larger inequality of happiness in a given country and period (Alesina et al. 2004 , Delhey and Dragolov 2014 , Oishi et al. 2011 . Two recent reviews of the literature conclude that higher levels of economic inequality tend to be associated, in Western societies, with lower levels of subjective wellbeing (Senik 2009 : 3, Schneider 2016 : 1725 .
At the same time, there is a well-established finding that inequality in life satisfaction has been falling in most Western countries since the early 1980s (Clark et al. 2016 , Veenhoven 2005 . This evolution is puzzling as we observe, over the same period, a U-turn in income inequality with widening gaps between top earners and low earners (Alderson and Nielsen 2002, OECD 2011a) .
Unlike for the bulk of countries, the evolution in life satisfaction is ambiguous for the United States and Germany. In the US, happiness inequality decreased from its highest level in the 1970s all the way through the 1990s, but started to rise again in the 2000s (Dutta and Foster 2013) . When decomposing changes in the distribution of subjective wellbeing between 1972 , Stevenson and Wolfers (2008 find that the black-white gap in happiness has declined and the gender gap disappeared. Yet the inequality in happiness by education -possibly a proxy for the social class gradient -has increased: happiness was rising among college graduates, decreasing among respondents with some college, and falling sharply among those with a high school degree or less.
In Germany, inequality in happiness seems to have steadily decreased during the 1980s and early 1990s. Starting from the mid-1990s, the evolution has either been described as trendless fluctuation (Clark et al. 2016) or, less persuasively, as showing a slight increase in happiness inequality (Becchetti et al. 2013) . What seems undisputed is that the 1990s saw a break in the downward trend towards less inequality in subjective wellbeing.
What are the mechanisms that lead from economic inequality to life satisfaction? A first argument is rooted in sociology and expects inequality to increase social distance and reduce the feelings of togetherness. Inequality thus erodes social trust and social capital, thereby making a community less liveable Dragolov 2014, Veenhoven 1995) . A second argument draws on social psychology and maintains that growing income inequality exacerbates unfavourable status comparisons and leads to greater status anxiety (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) . A third argument stems from political science and expects rising inequality to result in heightened conflicts over material resources and lower overall life satisfaction (Haller and Hadler 2006) . Empirical evidence suggests that perceptions of social trust and status anxiety -but less so of conflicts -, partly mediate the inequality-wellbeing link in Europe (Delhey and Dragolov 2014) .
While this research strand examines how income inequality observed at the level of a region or country affects the subjective well-being of all individuals, our objective is somewhat different. We aim at uncovering the extent -and the evolution -of the disparity in life satisfaction across social classes. By analysing the social class gradient in well-being and its evolution over time, our focus is on economic mechanisms and on how earnings and unemployment risks affects the life satisfaction of people in different class positions.
The German working-class left behind
Why would we expect a rising gap in life satisfaction across different social classes in Germany since the 1990s? Our argument is that over the last two decades, the economic destiny of the working and the upper-middle class has diverged strongly. The key mechanism that we expect to have driven a wedge in the life satisfaction of the lower and upper classes relates to the labour market, notably the differential evolution of unemployment risks, working conditions and earnings.
During the post-reunification recession, unemployment rose rapidly and remained at over 8 per cent for 15 years in a row, from 1993 to 2007. In Germany, unemployment afflicted low educated workers -mostly set in the low-skilled working class -much more than high educated workers. Over the 1990s, the unemployment rate of workers with no more than ten years of formal education was, on average, 2.6 times higher than that of workers with tertiary education. Over the 2000s, this ratio increased to 3.8 (OECD, Education at a Glance, various years).
During this long crisis, there was also a weakening of those collective institutions that impose public obligations on employers and thus primarily benefit workers with little bargaining power: older workers, those in temporary contracts and the working class more generally (Carr and Chung 2014) The triple influence of persistently high unemployment, the weakening of collective paysetting institutions and cutbacks in unemployment benefits put Germany's working class under increased market pressure and reduced the wage floor. The result was, after the 1990s, an unprecedented rise in low-wage (and often atypical) work (Eichhorst and Marx 2011) and income inequality (Antonczyk et al 2010) . In the early 2000s, income inequality in Germany increased more than twice as much as in the average of the OECD (OECD 2011b).
What do these shifts in the labour market mean for the social class gradient in life satisfaction? As Germany's institutional safeguards have become less effective at sheltering low-skilled workers from insufficient earnings and unemployment, we would expect an increasing class gradient. More precisely, over the last two decades, the gap in life satisfaction between the upper-middle and low-skilled working class should have widened in Germany.
Contrasting the German experience with Switzerland
Our hypothesis of a widening gap in life satisfaction may be countered by the argument that this increasing gap may well be due to other factors than the rise of unemployment and earnings inequality and the dismantling of labour market institutions. Low-educated workers may have come under pressure everywhere in the OECD as a consequence of international trade and offshoring or skill-biased technological change and automation. Life may thus have become more difficult for low-educated workers across Europe, the situation in Germany being by no means particular.
An ideal case to contrast the German experience -and the effect of unemployment and income inequality -is neighbouring Switzerland. Switzerland has a majority of Germanspeakers and shares several institutional features with Germany, from vocational education to industry-based collective bargaining. However, contrary to Germany, Switzerland's unemployment rate remained low, its wage-setting institutions were not dismantled and unemployment benefits are comparatively generous with a replacement rate of 70 to 80 per cent over 18 to 24 months. The generosity of benefits is not irrelevant: the adverse effect of unemployment on life satisfaction in Europe seems to almost double if unemployment benefits are meagre (Wulfgramm 2014, see also Carr and . Most importantly, in Switzerland the trend in wage inequality was basically flat and thus stands in stark contrast to the steep increase in Germany (OECD 2011b, Grabka 2012, Kuhn and Suter 2015) .
By comparing the evolution of life satisfaction in Germany with that in Switzerland, we obtain a simple difference-in-difference design. Switzerland thus serves us as a contrast case where unemployment and income inequality remained basically constant over the last two decades. 
Data, measures and estimation method

Datasets
Variables and measures
Our dependent variable is self-reported life satisfaction and based on the question: 'How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?', with answers ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). Although this 11-point scale is, strictly speaking, an ordinal variable, we follow the established practice in the wellbeing literature and treat it as a cardinal variable (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004) . This allows us to compute the mean value of life satisfaction.
Our key independent variable is social class where we use an aggregated version of the schema proposed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and distinguish four hierarchically ordered classes: (i) the upper and upper-middle class containing large employers, managers and professionals; (ii) the lower-middle class including small employers, technicians and associate professionals; (iii) the skilled working class including clerks, craftsmen, skilled service and sales workers; (iv) the low-skilled working class containing assemblers, machine operators, farmhands, low-skilled service and sales workers, and other elementary occupations. Respondents are allocated to one of these four classes based on their current occupation or, if missing, their past occupation. If both variables are missing, we use the partner's occupation. We thus also attribute a class location to the unemployed and economically inactive. The idea is that unemployed lawyers (or an economically inactive person married to a lawyer) face different life chances than an unemployed assembler (or an economically inactive person married to an assembler).
The key information to build our class measure comes from occupations, measured ISCO 4-digit. Additionally, we use information on self-employment and the number of employees to allocate employers with more than 9 employees to the upper-middle class, regardless of their occupation. In a similar vein, small employers (1 to 9 employees) whose occupation is neither manager nor professional are attributed to the lower-middle class. 1 We examine whether class differences in life satisfaction are due to differences in unemployment and income inequality by using variables at both the individual and contextual level. We measure unemployment at the individual level by distinguishing three different employment statuses (in paid work, unemployed, out of the labour force). At the contextual level, we use the annual unemployment rate of a given Bundesland (Germany) or greater region (Switzerland). For earnings, we use the logarithm of the equivalent household (postgovernment) total income, taking into account all sources of income. At the contextual level, we measure income inequality as the ratio p80/p20 of equivalent household incomes in a given Bundesland or greater region in a given year.
In addition, we introduce control variables for sex, age group, Bundesland/Greater region, nationality (national vs. non-national) and living together with a partner. Of particular interest are period effects; we introduce calendar year both as a linear term and, to check for a nonlinear evolution over time, as yearly dummies. Table A .1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of our variables.
Method and model
We first examine the evolution of life satisfaction across social classes by calculating the yearly means, using weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) . 2 We then analyze a multivariate between-estimator (BE) model which solely uses the cross-sectional (between) variance in life satisfaction, and not the time (within) variance. The rationale behind using between-variance only is that classes are largely composed of the same people over time, as entry into a class is contingent on time-constant factors such as social origin and, above all, education. A medical doctor is likely to belong to the upper-middle class over the entire career and a farmhand without post-mandatory education is unlikely to leave the low-skilled working class.
Of course, there is some initial job hopping and (short-range) occupational mobility at the beginning of careers. For this reason, we exclude respondents younger than 30 from our analytical sample. However, most people arrive at their stable class position over the course of their thirties (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 72, Mayer 2000: 274) . A transition matrix for the German Socio-Economic Panel tells us that only a small share of all workers is mobile across classes: on average, 12 per cent in the low-skilled working class and 8 per cent in the upper-middle class change class from one year to the next over our period of observation.
Moreover, there is ample evidence that occupational changes are overestimated in panel surveys due to measurement errors (Perales 2014) .
By using the between-estimator, we do not enquire about how individual mobility between classes affects life satisfaction of the small minority of mobile people. Rather, we focus on how life satisfaction varies between different classes in a given year and over a given period.
We therefore treat our longitudinal panel data (SOEP and SHP) the same way as our repeated cross-sectional data (ESS) where the between-estimator corresponds to a simple OLS regression. Of course, this means that our analysis of life satisfaction in two countries has little causal traction. We are much better prepared to describe how life satisfaction varies between different classes over time than to explain why it varies.
The equation of our linear regression model is given as: there is a different evolution in life satisfaction between classes over periods, this effect will be picked up by the interaction term. We correct for auto-correlation in our panel data by using panel-corrected clustered standard errors.
The class gap in life satisfaction over time
Before we estimate a multivariate model of life satisfaction, we provide descriptive evidence for the class difference in life satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of life satisfaction in each class (left-hand panel) and plot the difference in life satisfaction between the highest and lowest class (right-hand panel). We observe the same class pattern for both countries, with higher classes consistently reporting higher life satisfaction than lower classes.
Life satisfaction in West Germany fell during the 1980s for all classes (see Figure 1 ). In the early 1990s, the fall came to a standstill for the upper-middle class, but continued for the other classes. Life satisfaction decreased for the low-skilled working class until 2007/8, and then began to rise again. Accordingly, the gap in life satisfaction between the top and bottom was the smallest during the reunification boom 1990 to 1991, and the largest in 2008 to 2010, before the recovery of the German labour market finally began in earnest. At its maximum, the class disparity in life satisfaction was 0.73 points on the 11-point life satisfaction scale and hence comparable to the gap between the more satisfied people who have a partner and the less satisfied people who do not have a partner (see Table 1 below for the estimates). 
A multivariate analysis of the class gap in life satisfaction
We scrutinize the link between class and life satisfaction more closely in a multivariate model. The coefficients of interest are shown for both datasets for Germany in Table 1 and for Switzerland in Table 2 . After controlling for sex, age, nationality, region and year, we still find a large main effect for class in Germany (see model M1). In 1984, the members of the low-skilled working class were less satisfied by 0.47 points (SOEP) than their counterparts of the upper-middle class. The interaction between class and years suggests that with every ten years that passed, the class gap increased by another 0.10 points. Compared with the uppermiddle class, the members of the low-skilled working class have become increasingly dissatisfied with their lives over the last three decades. In the European Social Survey, we obtain a class gap of 0.85 for the early 2000s -without any clear class differences in the evolution over time.
If we further control in model M2 for being unemployed or economically inactive as well as for the regional unemployment rate, the main effect decreases only slightly, but the negative time trend in the SOEP for the low-skilled working class disappears. As is visible if we plot these results graphically, this means that the widening class gap between 1990 and 2005 is partly due to the differential effect that unemployment has on different classes. Once we further add our two income measures at the individual and regional level, the class effects Note: All models additionally control for sex, age group, nationality, region, and, in the SOEP, for the type of sample Note: All models additionally control for sex, age group, nationality, and region
In Switzerland, our two datasets cover almost the same period, and the class coefficients During the years right before and after the Great Recession (which was not a great recession in Germany), the class gap stabilized and, in the last period, began to decrease after 2010 when unemployment dropped and real earnings finally began to rise. Clearly, the differential evolution of unemployment risks and household earnings across classes goes a long way to explain the variation in the class gap over time. If we control for unemployment in model M2, the class gap in life satisfaction decreases substantially and gives rise to a curvilinear evolution without any downward trend, thus simply mirroring the business cycle. If we further account for household earnings and regional inequality, the disparity between classes in a given year and over time becomes small and amounts to no more than 0.1 to 0.3 points. We find no evidence for the expectation that as societies get richer and have more resources to spend on public goods, the class gradient in life satisfaction automatically falls (Clark et al. 2016) . Despite the sluggish labour market and several cyclical slumps, Germany's economy continued to expand over most of the 1990s and 2000s and German GDP increased by almost a third between 1992 and 2012. However, as these two decades were synonymous with high unemployment and increasing income inequality, there was a widening class gap. Only after 2008, when the German labour market had recovered and unemployment rates were plummeting, did the class gradient in life satisfaction begin to decrease.
Our results thus suggest that life satisfaction of different classes diverges over the business cycle. As unemployment rises and work income stagnates, the lower classes are disproportionately affected in their subjective wellbeing. In comparison to their counterparts in the upper-middle class, they are less sheltered from economic downturns and suffer more from the deregulation of institutional safeguards in the labour market. Accordingly, when the economy picks up speed again and the labour market recovers -as during the boom in Germany after 2009 -the low-skilled working class succeeds in reducing the disparity in life satisfaction relative to the upper classes.
Finally, it is noteworthy that our comparison of Germany and Switzerland shows an analogous class gradient in life satisfaction in both countries. Respondents in higher classes are, on average, more satisfied with their lives than respondents in lower classes. However, regardless whether we compare the long-running panel datasets or the samples of the European Social Survey, we find the class gap in life satisfaction to be substantially larger in Germany than in Switzerland -and this gap is far from trivial. In Germany, the difference in subjective well-being between the upper-middle class and the low-skilled working class is almost as large as the gap in life satisfaction between partnered and non-partnered individuals. Note: class 1 refers to "low-skilled working class", class 2 to "skilled working class", class 3 to "lower-middle class", class 4 to "upper-middle class"
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